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REPLY TO THE CITY'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The order of the trial court consists of a declaration of statutory construction. 
The court's written order states that "there is no material difference on the 
dispositive point of law between the two versions of the statute at issue. Under 
either the 2001 or 2003 versions of the disconnection statute, if a disconnection 
would result in an unincorporated island, the disconnection should be disallowed." 
See Order dated June 3, 2008. R. at 1111. Both parties and the trial court agree 
that allowing a disconnection in this case would result, at least theoretically, in an 
island of unincorporated territory bordered on two sides by Cedar Hills and on two 
sides by Pleasant Grove. R. at 1112. See the map of the Harvey property that is 
the subject of this disconnection, attached as Tab 6 in the Addendum to the city's 
brief. The trial court's ruling does not consider any facts other than the location of 
the property and the fact that an unincorporated island would result if 
disconnection were allowed. 
The city has included numerous factual assertions in their brief. These facts 
and many of their arguments are an attempt to persuade the court that 
disconnection is not viable or in the interests of justice. The facts presented by the 
city are an inaccurate and incomplete representation of the complex factual history 
surrounding this disconnection matter. Several of the facts cited in the city's brief 
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are disputed and the inclusion of these statements on appeal is both disingenuous 
and irrelevant to the present issue on appeal. The Harveys have resisted the 
temptation to present their own laundry list of facts that indicate the city's 
culpability in this matter. 
In ruling that both the 2001 and 2003 versions of the disconnection statute 
completely bar unincorporated islands of any kind, the trial court denied the parties 
the opportunity to present the factual evidence as to the appropriateness of the 
disconnection. Indeed, the Harvey's primaiy objective in raising this appeal is to 
be allowed to present evidence of the viability of the disconnection as well as the 
factual situation which prompted their petition for disconnection. The Harveys are 
confident that, given this opportunity, the court will recognize that granting 
disconnection is clearly in the interests of justice and equity. 
Due to the complexity of this eight-year-old case, there is a mountain of 
evidence on both sides which would be persuasive in determining the 
appropriateness of the disconnection in terms of viability and justice. However, 
this court is not charged with making that determination on appeal. The 
presentation of this evidence is properly reserved for the trial court on remand after 
this court rules that the plain language of the 2001 disconnection statute does not 
constitute an automatic bar of all unincorporated islands. 
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The issue on appeal is simple. If there is any conceivable factual scenario in 
which an unincorporated island would be allowed under the 2001 statue, then the 
case should be remanded to the trial court where the parties can present the factual 
evidence for the judge's consideration. 
REPLY TO THE CITY'S ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROPOSED DISCONNECTION DOES NOT CREATE AN 
UNINCORPORATED ISLAND RESULTING WITHIN OR 
PROJECTING INTO THE BOUNDARIES OF CEDAR HILLS 
As stated in the Harveys' principle brief, the 2001 statute does not even 
contain the term "island of unincorporated territory." The islands referred to in the 
2001 statute are islands which "result within or project into the boundaries of the 
municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
10-2-503(2)(i) (2001). Brief of the Harveys at 10-13. 
The city admits that while the 2003 statute clarified that unincorporated 
islands of any kind are absolutely prohibited, that prior versions of the statute dealt 
only with islands wholly within a single city. Brief of the city at 17. The city 
indicates that Utah courts have always first determined whether or not an island 
was created prior to making a determination with respect to disconnection. Id. at 
21. However, the cases cited by the city in support of this argument all indicate 
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that the courts considered only unincorporated islands wholly within the city 
boundaries. In Re Disconnection of Certain Territory from Highland, 668 P.2d 
544, 546 (Utah 1983) ("disconnection would create no islands or peninsulas 
within the city's boundaries...."); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Farmington 
City, 599 P.2d 1242, 1247 (Utah 1979) ("avoid the creation of an unincorporated 
island in the midst of the city...."). Emphasis added. 
The property at issue in this case would not create an island of 
unincorporated territory either wholly within or projecting into Cedar Hills. See 
the map of the Harvey property that is the subject of this disconnection, attached as 
Tab 6 in the Addendum to the city's brief. The subject property is bordered on two 
sides by Cedar Hills and on two sides by Pleasant Grove. The facts are clear. The 
Harvey disconnection would not result in the type of unincorporated island 
prohibited by the 2001 statue. 
H. UNDER THE 2001 DISCONNECTION STATUTE, THE CREATION 
OF UNINCORPORATED ISLANDS AND/OR PENINSULAS IS ONE 
OF SEVERAL FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE 
DETERMINATION OF VIABILITY AND JUSTICE 
Under the 2001 version of the disconnection statute, the discussion of islands 
and peninsulas is part of a lengthy list of factors to be considered in determining 
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whether the disconnection will materially increase the cost and burden of providing 
services to other areas within the city. 
10-2-503 Criteria for disconnection. 
(1) The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection 
will leave the municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for 
which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would 
materially increase over previous years or for which it would become 
economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a municipality. 
(2) in making that determination, the commissioners shall consider 
all relevant factors including the effect of the disconnection on: 
(a) the city or community as a whole; 
(b) adjoining property owners; 
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways; 
(d) water mains and water services; 
(e) sewer mains and sewer services; 
(f) law enforcement; 
(g) zoning; 
(h) other municipal services; and 
(i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large and varied-shaped 
peninsular land masses result within or project into the boundaries of 
the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-503 (2001). Emphasis added 
While the city employs some creative arguments indicating that factor (i) on 
this long list of relevant factors is a determinative factor, the plain language of the 
statute simply does not support this argument. The city insists that the creation of 
an island or peninsula will always materially increase the cost of providing 
municipal services. See brief of the city at 16. There is nothing in the text of the 
statute that indicates that the legislators intended this to be a "super factor" holding 
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more weight than any other factor on this list. The city's argument is based almost 
entirely on arguments gleaned from dicta in the Blujfdale case which discusses the 
2003 statute, which clearly disallows unincorporated islands of any kind, rather 
than the 2001 statute at issue in this appeal. Blujfdale Mountain Homes, L.C., v. 
Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, 167 P.3d 1016. 
The city reasons that each individual factor listed in the statute must "carry a 
meaning and value separate from the balance of the statute." Brief of the city at 15. 
The city then makes the bold assumption that the ONLY possible reason for 
evaluating whether islands and offending peninsulas result from the petition to 
disconnect is because they inherently disrupt, impair or inhibit services. Id. 
Because the impact of the disconnection on various municipal services are listed as 
separate factors, the city argues that unless the creation of islands and offending 
peninsulas are out-rightly prohibited, that the inclusion of the island/peninsula 
factor would be superfluous. Id. 
This argument is unpersuasive for a couple of different reasons. First, the 
first factor to be considered is the effect of the disconnection on 'the city or 
community as a whole." This broadly construed factor would clearly encompass 
all of the other factors. Under the city's reasoning, all subsequent factors would be 
superfluous. Secondly, there are other reasons why a court might wish to consider 
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the creation of an island or peninsula other than the impact on municipal services. 
Indeed, there is nothing in the plain language of the statute to indicate that any of 
the factors are dispositive. 
The city further argues that the intent of the 2001 statute is made clear by the 
2003 statute. In support of this argument, the city cites the oral testimony of 
legislators introducing the 2003 bill. However, this testimony does not speak to 
the legislators' intent when drafting the 2001 version. In fact, there is no need for 
the court to look to oral legislative testimony or other documents at all because the 
plain language of the statute is not ambiguous. Statutory construction begins and, 
if possible, ends with the statute's plain language. State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795 (Utah 
2002); State v. Redd, 992 P.2d 986, 990 (Utah 1999). 
The 2001 disconnection statute requires the consideration of various factors 
in determining the viability and equity of allowing the disconnection. None of 
these factors are outcome determinative. The plain language of the statute merely 
requires the fact finder to consider all of the factors in weighing the 
appropriateness of the disconnection. These factors must be considered and 
findings of fact regarding these factors are required. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-505 
(5) (2001). This statutory construction is consistent with other provisions within 
the Utah Code that use the identical language "shall consider all relevant factors." 
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IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AMOUNT TO A 
FACTUAL INQUIRY AND SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY A 
TRIER OF FACT 
The public policy considerations against creation of islands listed by the city 
include: symmetrical municipal boundaries, the ability of the county to provide 
services to the island, and the ability of the city to provide services within the city. 
Brief of the city at 23. As stated previously, these considerations are taken from 
the Bluffdale case, which is based on the 2003 statute. Bluffdale, 2007 UT 57. 
Each of these considerations are entirely fact specific. In order to determine 
the appropriate outcome based on these factors, the parties should be given the 
opportunity to present evidence with respect to the boundaries and the ability of 
the various local governments to provide needed services. Despite the city's 
efforts to interject unsubstantiated facts and arguments based on services and park 
land in the city, it would not be appropriate for the court to make a determination 
since no evidence was heard in the trial court below. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue before the court is simple. Does the 2001 disconnection statute 
allow for the creation of an unincorporated island of any kind? Clearly the answer 
to this question is yes. The creation of unincorporated islands is one factor to be 
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considered under this statute as a part of the total analysis of the viability and 
justice of approving disconnection. Further, the 2001 statute does not even 
require the fact finder to consider islands that are not wholly within the city or 
protruding into the city. In this case, the Harvey property does not constitute an 
island wholly within or protruding into the city. The Harveys have been denied 
the opportunity to present their case for disconnection as a result of the inaccurate 
interpretation of the statute. 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the decision of the district 
court granting summary judgment to the City of Cedar Hills. The matter should 
be remanded to the district court with instructions to hear evidence and make a 
final determination based upon the substantive criteria outlined in the 2001 
disconnection statute. 
DATED this h day of March 2009. 
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C. 
Gordon Duval 
Attorney for Appellants 
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